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Photon number resolving monitoring is a practical light source monitoring scheme in QKD sys-
tems, which reduces the impacts from untrusted sources effectively. This scheme requires a single
photon detector, normally working at low temperature to suppress its dark count rate. In this
paper, we use a room-temperature detector and show that the dark count rate is irrelevant to the
monitoring performance in our scheme, which can sufficiently relax requirements on the detector’s
working conditions as well as integration complexity, and this would be highly demanded for prac-
tical systems. Furthermore, influences of parameter drifts at room temperature are analyzed, and
the monitoring scheme is testified in a real QKD system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a theoretically se-
cure method to distribute secret keys between the infor-
mation transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). Af-
ter more than three decades’ development, QKD is com-
ing to the edge of commercial applications. However, in
real QKD systems, loopholes in optical components may
cause practical security issues, among which the loop-
holes in quantum sources and detectors are the most
vulnerable ones [1–8]. Recently-proposed measurement-
device-independent protocol has removed the loopholes
in detectors with practical techniques [9–13], while those
in sources still remain. Normally, weak coherent sources,
rather than ideal single photon sources, are used in prac-
tical systems, and decoy state protocol is adopted to re-
duce multi-photon imperfections [14, 15]. Under these
conditions, the practical security of QKD systems is guar-
anteed by trusted sources, whose photon number distri-
bution is known to Alice. In practice, trusted sources
are not always available especially under the attack of
eavesdroppers, thus light source monitoring (LSM) is in-
dispensable [16–19].
Commonly, there are three kinds of LSM methods, in-
cluding average photon number monitoring [3, 17], ‘Un-
tagged bits’ monitoring [19–21], and photon number re-
solving (PNR) monitoring [22, 23], among which PNR is
the most precise. Ideal PNR monitoring requires a pho-
ton number resolving detector, which can be replaced by
a single photon detector (SPD) with a variable attenua-
tor in practical scheme. The SPD used in a QKD system
is normally an InGaAs avalanche photon diode detector,
being cooled down by a thermo-electric cooler and work-
ing below −30◦C∼−50◦C to suppress its dark count rate
(DCR) [24–27]. However, when working at room tem-
perature, an InGaAs SPD will have a high DCR [27, 28],
which is not suitable for the receiver of QKD system but
has potential of application in LSM.
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In this paper, we propose and realize PNR LSM based
on a room-temperature SPD. This scheme reduces the re-
quirements of the SPD’s working conditions as well as its
size and power consumptions significantly by removing
cooler from the module, which makes it much easier to
integrate the monitoring module in a QKD system. We
prove that high DCR at room temperature leads to no
degradation of the performance of monitoring, thus guar-
antees high security for practical QKD systems. Influ-
ences of parameter drifts as well as modifications on the
mathematical model are also presented. Furthermore,
our scheme is testified with a real QKD system.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II A, we
discuss the mechanisms of why the performance of our
LSM scheme is immune to high DCR at room temper-
ature. In Sec. II B, effects of parameter drifts and the
corresponding modifications on the mathematical model
are presented. In Sec. III, we measure the ranges of the
parameter drifts in real detectors and realize PNR LSM
with a room temperature SPD in a practical QKD sys-
tem.
II. LSM WITH A PNR DETECTOR AT ROOM
TEMPERATURE
In this section, we start from a review of the basic
theory of PNR LSM and then extend the discussion to
the case where a room-temperature SPD is used, and
also analyze the potential influences due to the parameter
drifts of SPD.
A. LSM with a PNR Detector
In BB84 protocol, according to the GLLP theory, the
secure key rate R of a QKD system is [29]
R =
1
2
Q{∆1[1−H2(e1)]−H2(E)}, (1)
where Q and E indicate the count rate and quantum bit
error rate (QBER) in a QKD system, ∆1 and e1 indicate
2the probability and bit error rate of single-photon pulses.
Decoy state protocol was introduced to estimate ∆1
and e1 more precisely, offering an effective way to deal
with the multi-photon problem caused by weak coherent
sources [14, 15, 30]. In double decoy states protocol, the
transmitter Alice modulates the intensity of light pulses
randomly into three states: signal, decoy, and vacuum
state, whose light fields are
ρsignal =
∞∑
n=0
an|n〉〈n|,
ρdecoy =
∞∑
n=0
a′n|n〉〈n|,
ρvacuum = |0〉〈0|,
(2)
where an and a
′
n are the coefficients of Fock state |n〉,
assumed to be known and controlled by Alice. However,
in practical QKD systems, the untrusted source problem
still remains, and a lower bound of ∆1 is given by [18]
∆1 ≥
aL1 (a
L
2Qd − a
′U
2 Qs − a
L
2 a
′U
0 Y0 + a
′U
2 a
L
0 Y0)
Qs(a′U1 a
L
2 − a
L
1 a
U
2 )
, (3)
where aUn (a
L
n) is the upper (lower) bound of n photons’
probability in signal state and a′Un (a
′L
n ) is the correspond-
ing bound in decoy state, which needs to be monitored
in real regime by LSM.
The ideal PNR LSM theory requires a photon number
resolving detector, but a practical SPD is used in real sit-
uations to estimate {aUn , a
L
n , a
′U
n , a
′L
n }. Among the prac-
tical PNR LSM schemes, the passive scheme is a more
practical one, as shown in Fig. 1 [22].
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FIG. 1. Practical passive PNR LSM scheme. The untrusted
source in the information transmitter (Alice) may be influ-
enced or controlled by the eavesdropper (Eve). After being
emitted from the source, a light pulse passes through an op-
tical filter (Fil), a phase randomizer (PR), and an attenua-
tor (Att). The pulse will be encoded and a beam splitter
(BS) with a transmittance ηBS separates it into two beams.
One goes through a variable optical attenuator (VOA) with a
transmittance η to the monitoring SPD, and the other is sent
through the quantum channel to the receiver (Bob).
In this scheme, the practical SPD is equivalent to an
‘ideal’ one with an attenuator with transmittance ηD in
front of it (Fig. 2). An ‘Ideal’ detector here is defined to
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FIG. 2. Practical establishment of PNR monitoring (a) is
equivalent to the ideal model (b). A practical PNR detector
can be regarded as an ‘ideal’ SPD with an attenuator (ηD) in
front of it.
have a quantum detection efficiency of 100% with nonzero
DCR. ηBS is the transmittance of BS and we set
ηBS = (1 − ηBS)ηD, (4)
so that the photon number distribution of the light field
before entering the quantum channel and that of ρ′ in
Fig. 2 are the same. Thus, the light field ρ′ in signal
state reads
ρ′signal =
∞∑
n=0
an|n〉〈n|, (5)
while ρ′ in decoy state reads
ρ′decoy =
∞∑
n=0
a′n|n〉〈n|. (6)
In signal state, when the light beam passes the VOA
with transmittance of η, the probability of detecting zero
photon with the detector is
P (η) = (1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
(1− η)nan = (1− λ)P0(η), (7)
where λ is the DCR of SPD. P0(η) is the probability
of detecting zero photon with the ‘ideal’ detector, being
irrelevant to λ.
If Alice chooses different η ∈ {η0, η1, η2} (η0 > η1 > η2)
randomly, {aUn , a
L
n , a
′U
n , a
′L
n } can be calculated with P (η)
under different situations, and P (η) is measured with the
count rates of the monitoring detector. We set η0 = 1,
thus {aUn , a
L
n} are given by (more detailed calculations
3are shown in Appendix A.)
P0(η0) =
P (η0)
1− λ
,
aU0 = a
L
0 = P0(η0),
aU1 =
P0(η1)− P0(η0)
1− η1
,
aL1 =
P0(η1)− P0(η0)[1− (1 − η1)
2]− (1 − η1)
2
(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2
,
aU2 =
P0(η2)− P0(η0)− (1− η2)a
L
1
(1− η2)2
,
aL2 =
P0(η2)− P0(η0)[1− (1 − η2)
3]
(1 − η2)2 − (1− η2)3
−
[1− η2 − (1− η2)
3]aU1 − (1− η2)
3
(1− η2)2 − (1− η2)3
.
(8)
Similarly, we can get {a′Un , a
′L
n } in decoy state. The above
equations prove that when λ is known and stable to Alice,
{aUn , a
L
n} and {a
′U
n , a
′L
n } can be computed even though λ
is much higher than its value in low-temperature regime.
Typically, an InGaAs avalanche photon diode detector
works under −30◦C∼−50◦C to suppress its DCR [24–27].
When working at 1550 nm and having a detection effi-
ciency of 10%, the DCR of the SPD is 10−7 ∼ 10−5 per
pulse at low temperature, but it will rise to a relatively
high level at room temperature [27, 31–35]. In our exper-
iment, the SPD has a DCR around 5.4× 10−6 per pulse
at low temperature, while 5.8 × 10−4 at room tempera-
ture. A high DCR will increase the time of calculating
monitoring results, but as λ≪ 1 still holds at room tem-
perature, the increase of time is negligible. Meanwhile,
working at room temperature not only reduces the re-
quirements of working conditions of the SPD, but also
decreases its size and power consumptions by simplify-
ing (even removing) its temperature control, thus makes
the monitoring detector much easier to be integrated in
QKD systems as an important complement enhancing its
practical security.
In the following part, modifications of {a
U(L)
n , a
′(U)L
n }
are discussed when considering the parameter drifts
of practical SPD. Accoring to current QKD experi-
ments [36–39], in the simulation and experiment below,
we set µ = 0.6, ν = 0.1. η1, η2 are chosen from these pairs
of values: {η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1; η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.5; η1 =
0.8, η2 = 0.1; η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2} (the discussion of the
values of η1 and η2 can be found in Appendix A).
B. Fluctuation of Dark Count Rate and Detection
Efficiency
In our LSM scheme, the DCR of the room-temperature
SPD is required to be known and stable, but it inevitably
fluctuates in actual environments. Other parameters, es-
pecially the detection efficiency of SPD, may also drift.
If the parameters drifts are ignored, the final secret key
rate could be overestimated. To solve this problem, one
method is to monitor all the parameters of the detector
in real time and calculate secret key rate with actual val-
ues. This will increase the system complexity obviously,
and moreover, it is difficult to monitor all the parameters
continuously. A more simple solution is to measure the
range of parameter drifts and to modify {aUn , a
L
n , a
′U
n , a
′L
n }
with the worst cases within the fluctuation range, which
gives a reasonable estimation of the lower bound of se-
cret key rate R. In the following part, the derivation of
modified mathematical model with parameter drifts as
well as their valid range are presented. The modification
results when using a real room-temperature SPD will be
discussed in the experiment section.
Considering the drift of the DCR of SPD, we denote
the original DCR as λ, while λ′ is the actual DCR with
drifting, and λ′ = (1 + δ)λ, where |δλ| ≪ 1. {aUn , a
L
n}
are the bounds calculated with λ and {aUn,DCR, a
L
n,DCR}
are the bounds with λ′. {aUn,DCR, a
L
n,DCR} (n = 0, 1, 2)
are given by (more detailed derivations are shown in Ap-
pendix B)
aU0,DCR = a
L
0,DCR ≈ a
U
0 (1 + δλ),
aU1,DCR ≈ a
U
1 (1 + δλ),
aL1,DCR ≈ a
L
1 (1 + δλ)− δλ
1− η1
η1
,
aU2,DCR ≈ a
U
2 (1 + δλ),
aL2,DCR ≈ a
L
2 (1 + δλ)− δλ
1− η2
η2
.
(9)
Using Eq. 9, we calculate the system’s secret key rate
R and the maximum transmission distance L when DCR
drifts, as in Fig. 3 [40].
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FIG. 3. Transmission distance L of a QKD system when
the monitoring SPD’s DCR λ drifts. The original DCR λ =
5× 10−4 at room temperature.
The original DCR λ of room-temperature SPD is
5 × 10−4 per pulse, close to the DCR in actual envi-
ronment. L remains relatively stable when λ decreases,
4while decreases when λ increases and falls to zero when
λ is high enough. However, even when λ = 10−3, L only
decreases by 1 km as for {η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1}, and de-
creases by approximately 10 km when λ rises to 3×10−3.
As for the worst case {η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.1}, L decreases
by 6 km when λ = 10−3, while descends rapidly with
the further increase of λ and the system cannot gener-
ate keys when λ > 2.2 × 10−3. In practice, the DCR of
the SPD with a detection efficiency 10% never reaches
10−3 at room temperature, so the decline of L is within
10 km, an acceptable range in practical implementation.
We also observe that when η1 is fixed, the larger η2 is,
the larger tolerance the system has for the drift of DCR.
When the detection efficiency of the SPD varies with
time, the modification method should be discussed un-
der different conditions of both the increasing and the
decreasing efficiency. Let ηD represent the original de-
tection efficiency and η′D be the actual efficiency with
varying. When ηD rises to η
′
D, we have η
′
D = (1 + δ)ηD,
where |δηD| ≪ 1. {a
U
n , a
L
n} still represent the bounds
calculated with ηD, and {a
U
n,ηD↑
, aLn,ηD↑} are the actual
bounds when ηD rises to η
′
D. Thus, {a
U
n,ηD↑
, aLn,ηD↑} read
as
aU0,ηD↑ ≈ a
U
0 + a
U
1 δ + a
U
2 ·
δ2
1− δ
,
aL0,ηD↑ ≈ a
L
0 + a
L
1 δ + a
L
2 · δ
2,
aU1,ηD↑ ≈ (1− δ)[a
U
1 + a
U
2 ·
2δ − δ2
(1− δ)2
],
aL1,ηD↑ ≈ (1− δ)[a
L
1 + a
L
2 · 2δ],
aU2,ηD↑ ≈
aU2
1− δ
,
aL2,ηD↑ ≈ a
L
2 · (1 − δ)
2.
(10)
When ηD falls to η
′
D, we have ηD = (1−σ)η
′
D, which is
equivalent to ηD = (1+δ)η
′
D, where 1+δ =
1
1−σ , |δη
′
D| ≪
1. Then, {aUn,ηD↓, a
L
n,ηD↓
}, the actual bounds when ηD
decreases, read as
aU2,ηD↓ ≈
aU2
(1− δ)2
,
aL2,ηD↓ ≈ a
L
2 (1− δ),
aU1,ηD↓ ≈
aU1
1− δ
− aL2,ηD↓ · 2δ,
aL1,ηD↓ ≈
aL1
1− δ
− aU2,ηD↓ ·
2δ − δ2
(1− δ)2
,
aU0,ηD↓ ≈ a
U
0 − a
L
1,ηD↓ · δ − a
L
2,ηD↓ · δ
2,
aL0,ηD↓ ≈ a
L
0 − a
U
1,ηD↓ · δ − a
U
2,ηD↓ ·
δ2
1− δ
.
(11)
In conclusion, the bounds of {an,ηD} under the varia-
tion of detection efficiency ηD are given by (the detailed
derivation of {aUn,ηD , a
L
n,ηD
} is shown in Appendix B)
aUn,ηD = max{a
U
n,ηD↑
, aUn,ηD↓},
aLn,ηD = min{a
L
n,ηD↑
, aLn,ηD↓},
(n = 0, 1, 2).
(12)
Using Eq. 12, we simulate R and L when the detection
efficiency drifts, as in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. Transmission distance L of a QKD system when the
monitoring SPD’s detection efficiency ηD drifts. The original
efficiency ηD = 10% at room temperature.
The original efficiency ηD is 10% and for either cases
when it increases or decreases, the maximum transmis-
sion distance L will decline. As for {η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1},
L declines by 5 km when ηD increases by over 11.5% or
decreases by over 5%, and it declines by 20 km when ηD
increases by over 19% or decreases by over 12%. As for
the worst case {η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2}, L declines by 5 km
when ηD increases by over 4% or decreases by over 2.5%,
and declines by 20 km when ηD increases by over 9% or
decreases by over 7%. The detection efficiency fluctua-
tion here is the relative fluctuation of original detection
efficiency, which is 10% in both simulation and experi-
ment.
III. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In the experiment, we use an InGaAs SPD with its
thermo-electric cooler removed to make it work at room
temperature. Meanwhile, we use another detector work-
ing at low temperature (below −30◦C) for compari-
son [41]. Each detector’s DCR is measured continuously
over 60 minutes, and the results are shown in Fig. 5.
At low temperature, the DCR of SPD is stable, drifting
from 4.6 × 10−6 to 6.1 × 10−6, while the DCR of room-
temperature SPD drifts from 5.3×10−4 to 6.2×10−4, over
two orders of magnitude larger than the low-temperature
case.
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FIG. 5. Drifts of DCR of the detectors at low temperature
and room temperature over 60 minutes.
Each detector’s detection efficiency is also measured
over 60 minutes, and the results are shown in Fig. 6. The
original detection efficiency of the two detectors are both
10%, and the efficiency of the low temperature SPD drifts
within 1% of it in most occasions, while the efficiency
drifts within 2% of itself at room temperature.
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FIG. 6. Drifts of detection efficiency of the detectors at low
temperature and room temperature over 60 minutes.
Next, we compare the key rates when implementing
PNR LSM with a low-temperature SPD and a room-
temperature SPD in a practical QKD system, and we also
study the key rates with modification when considering
the parameter drifts, as shown in Fig. 7. According to
the discussion in Appendix A, we set {µ = 0.6, ν = 0.1}
and get secret key rates under two conditions, {η1 =
0.9, η2 = 0.1} and {η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2}.
For the case of {η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1}, the transmission
distances L are 117.1 km with a low-temperature SPD
and 111.0 km with a room-temperature SPD, and 116.8
km and 108.4 km respectively after being modified. As
for {η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2}, the transmission distances are
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FIG. 7. Secret key rates of a practical QKD system under
PNR LSM with a low-temperature and a room-temperature
SPD in experiment, and secret key rates with modification on
the parameter drifts.
103.7 km with a low-temperature SPD and 98.9 km with
a room-temperature SPD, and 95.0 km and 92.0 km for
the cases with modification. The secret key rates un-
der different situations at a distance of 50 km, a typical
distance in QKD networks, are also listed in Table. I.
TABLE I. Secret key rates of the QKD system at a distance
of 50 km under different situations. (Unit: per pulse)
µ = 0.9, ν = 0.1 µ = 0.8, ν = 0.2
Room Temperature 3.35× 10−4 1.89× 10−4
Room Temperature+modification 2.97× 10−4 1.34× 10−4
Low Temperature 4.43× 10−4 2.37× 10−4
Low Temperature+modification 4.38× 10−4 1.54× 10−4
It can be deduced that the PNR LSM scheme has com-
parable monitoring performances with such two detectors
for practical applications, and the difference in trans-
mission distances is less than 7 km, which may result
from the statistical fluctuations of count rates. When
6parameter drifts are taken into consideration, the trans-
mission distances only decrease slightly after being mod-
ified, which are 2.6 km and 6.9 km in the two situations
at room temperature, respectively. This proves that our
monitoring scheme as well as the modification method
are applicable in real QKD systems.
Compared with the low-temperature case, the secret
key rates at room temperature have a noticeable decline
almost reaching 25% before being modified. However,
the modification itself varies with η1 and η2 greatly. For
instance, at room temperature, R decreases by less than
12% when {η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1}, and decreases by nearly
30% when {η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2}. So values of η1 and η2
which insure long transmission distances and high secret
key rates also insure better performances under parame-
ter drifts of the SPD, which can be used as the criteria
for choosing appropriate values of η1 and η2. Still, at 50
km, the secret key rate can be higher than 100 kbps in
a 1 GHz QKD system with a monitoring SPD at room
temperature, totally comparable with current commer-
cial systems.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we propose and realize PNR LSM method
by using an SPD working at room temperature, and
prove that when the dark count rate of SPD is known
and stable, the high DCR has no influence on monitor-
ing performance. This can reduce the requirements of
the SPD’s working conditions, making it much easier to
integrate the monitor module in practical QKD systems.
Furthermore, the influences from the drifts of the DCR
and detection efficiency of SPD are analyzed, together
with a discussion of the related modification methods.
We also measure such two kind of drifts at both low tem-
perature and room temperature in real detectors, and re-
alize the scheme in a real QKD system. The experimental
results are in good agreement with the theoretical pre-
dictions and thus verify favorable prospect of using our
scheme in a practical system with the analysis of param-
eter drifts in real circumstances.
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Appendix A: Passive PNR LSM
In PNR LSM, Alice chooses different η ∈
{η0, η1, η2} (η0 > η1 > η2) randomly, so
{aUn , a
L
n} (n = 0, 1, 2) can be calculated with P (η)
of the PNR detector under different situations. When
η0 = 1,
P (η0 = 1) = (1− λ)a0 = (1− λ)P0(η0). (A1)
In this situation, the upper bound aU0 and lower bound
aL0 of a0 are equal,
a0 =
P (η0)
1− λ
= P0(η0) = a
U
0 = a
L
0 . (A2)
And it can be derived that
P (η1)
1 − λ
≥ a0 + (1 − η1)a1, (A3)
P (η1)
1 − λ
≤ a0 + (1 − η1)a1 + (1− η1)
2(1 − a0 − a1), (A4)
so aU1 and a
L
1 , the upper and lower bound of a1, read
a1 ≤
P (η1)− P (η0)
(1− λ)(1 − η1)
=
P0(η1)− P0(η0)
1− η1
= aU1 , (A5)
a1 ≥
P (η1)− P (η0)[1− (1− η1)
2]− (1− λ)(1 − η1)
2
(1− λ)[(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2]
=
P0(η1)− P0(η0)[1 − (1− η1)
2]− (1 − η1)
2
(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2
= aL1 . (A6)
Similarly,
P (η2)
1− λ
≥ a0 + (1− η2)a1 + (1 − η2)
2a2 ≥ a0 + (1− η2)a
L
1 + (1− η2)
2a2, (A7)
P (η2)
1− λ
≤ a0 + (1− η2)a1 + (1 − η2)
2a2 + (1− η2)
3(a3 + a4 + a5 + · · · )
≤ [1− (1 − η2)
3]a0 + [1− η2 − (1− η2)
3]aU1 + [(1 − η2)
2 − (1 − η2)
3]a2 + (1− η2)
3, (A8)
7so aU2 and a
L
2 read
a2 ≤
P (η2)− P (η0)− (1− λ)(1 − η2)a
L
1
(1− λ)(1 − η2)2
=
P0(η2)− P0(η0)− (1− η2)a
L
1
(1 − η2)2
= aU2 , (A9)
a2 ≥
P (η2)− P (η0)[1− (1 − η2)
3]− (1− λ)[1− η2 − (1− η2)
3]aU1 − (1− λ)(1 − η2)
3
(1− λ)[(1 − η2)2 − (1− η2)3]
=
P0(η2)− P0(η0)[1 − (1− η2)
3]− [1 − η2 − (1 − η2)
3]aU1 − (1− η2)
3
(1− η2)2 − (1− η2)3
= aL2 . (A10)
{a′Un , a
′L
n } can be calculated from the similar equations
in decoy state [22].
We set η2 < η1 < η0 = 1, and the choosing of different
η1 and η2 has great influence on the performance of this
monitoring scheme. Fig. 8 shows the maximum trans-
mission distance L of a QKD system corresponding to
different η1 and η2. The closer η1 is to 1 and η2 is to 0,
the longer L this system has. In this paper, we set η1 and
η2 from these typical pairs of values according to Fig. 8:
η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.1; η1 = 0.9, η2 = 0.5;
η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.1; η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.2.
We can find that when η0 = 1, the closer η1 is to 1 and
η2 to 0, the better the performance of PNR LSM scheme
is.
FIG. 8. Transmission distance L of QKD systems with PNR
LSM when choosing different η1 and η2 (η0 = 1).
Appendix B: Calculation on the Fluctuation of DCR
and Detection Efficiency
When the DCR λ changes into λ′, let λ′ = (1 +
δλ, |δλ| ≪ 1. As for aU0,DCR and a
L
0,DCR,
aU0,DCR = a
L
0,DCR =
P (η0)
1− λ′
= aU0
1− λ
1− λ′
≈ aU0 (1 + δλ).
(B1)
And for aU1,DCR and a
L
1,DCR,
aU1,DCR =
P (η1)− P (η0)
(1− λ′)(1 − η1)
= aU1
1− λ
1− λ′
≈ aU1 (1 + δλ),
aL1,DCR =
P (η1)− P (η0)[1− (1 − η1)
2]− (1 − λ′)(1 − η1)
2
(1− λ′)[(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2]
=
(P (η1)− P (η0)[1− (1− η1)2]− (1− λ)(1 − η1)2
(1− λ)[(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2]
−
δλ(1− η1)
2
(1− λ)[(1 − η1)− (1− η1)2]
) 1− λ
1− λ′
≈ aL1 (1 + δλ)− δλ
1 − η1
η1
.
(B2)
By using similar approximation, we can get aU2,DCR and
aL2,DCR as
aU2,DCR ≈ a
U
2 (1 + δλ),
aL2,DCR ≈ a
L
2 (1 + δλ)− δλ
1− η2
η2
.
(B3)
When the detector’s efficiency ηD increases to η
′
D, (1−
ηBS)ηD > ηBS . Let η
′
D = (1 + δ)ηD, |δηD| ≪ 1, we have
an,ηD↑ ≈
∞∑
m=n
PmC
n
m(1 − δ)
nδm−n. (B4)
As a result,
a0,ηD↑ =
∞∑
m=0
amδ
m = a0 + a1δ + a2δ
2 + . . . , (B5)
so
a0 + a1δ + a2δ
2 < a0,ηD↑
< a0 + a1δ + a2(δ
2 + δ3 + . . .)
= a0 + a1δ + a2 ·
δ2
1− δ
.
(B6)
And
a1,ηD↑ =
∞∑
m=1
am(1− δ)δ
m−1, (B7)
8so
(1− δ)(a1 + a2 · 2δ) < a1,ηD↑
< (1− δ)[a1 + a2(
∞∑
m=2
mδm−1)]
= (1− δ)[a1 + a2 ·
2δ − δ2
(1− δ)2
].
(B8)
Similarly,
a2,ηD↑ =
∞∑
m=2
am
m(m− 1)
2
(1− δ)2δm−2, (B9)
so
(1− δ)2a2 < a2,ηD↑
< (1− δ)2[a2(
∞∑
m=2
m(m− 1)
2
δm−2)] =
a2
1− δ
.
(B10)
Thus, when the detection efficiency ηD increases, the
upper bounds {aUn,ηD↑} and lower bounds {a
L
n,ηD↑
} of the
count rates of pulses with different photon numbers read
(n = 0, 1, 2)
aU0,ηD↑ = a
U
0 + a
U
1 δ + a
U
2 ·
δ2
1− δ
,
aL0,ηD↑ = a
L
0 + a
L
1 δ + a
L
2 · δ
2,
aU1,ηD↑ = (1− δ)[a
U
1 + a
U
2 ·
2δ − δ2
(1− δ)2
],
aL1,ηD↑ = (1− δ)[a
L
1 + a
L
2 · 2δ],
aU2,ηD↑ =
aU2
1− δ
,
aL2,ηD↑ = a
L
2 · (1− δ)
2.
(B11)
When ηD decreases to η
′
D, (1 − ηBS)ηD < ηBS . Let
η′D = (1 − σ)ηD , this is equivalent to ηD = (1 + δ)η
′
D,
where 1 + δ = 11−σ , |δη
′
D| ≪ 1. Then
an ≈
∞∑
m=n
am,ηD↓C
n
m(1− δ)
nδm−n. (B12)
As for a0, a1 and a2, we have
a0,ηD↓ + a1,ηD↓δ + a2,ηD↓δ
2 < a0
< a0,ηD↓ + a1,ηD↓δ + a2,ηD↓
δ2
1− δ
,
(B13)
(1− δ)(a1,ηD↓ + a2,ηD↓ · 2δ) < a1
< (1− δ)[a1,ηD↓ + a2,ηD↓ ·
2δ − δ2
(1 − δ)2
],
(B14)
(1− δ)2 · a2,ηD↓ < a2 <
a2,ηD↓
1− δ
. (B15)
So when ηD decreases, the upper bounds {a
U
n,ηD↓
} and
lower bounds {aLn,ηD↓} read (n = 0, 1, 2)
aU2,ηD↓ =
aU2
(1 − δ)2
,
aL2,ηD↓ = a
L
2 (1− δ),
aU1,ηD↓ =
aU1
1− δ
− aL2,ηD↓ · 2δ,
aL1,ηD↓ =
aL1
1− δ
− aU2,ηD↓ ·
2δ − δ2
(1 − δ)2
,
aU0,ηD↓ = a
U
0 − a
L
1,ηD↓ · δ − a
L
2,ηD↓ · δ
2,
aL0,ηD↓ = a
L
0 − a
U
1,ηD↓ · δ − a
U
2,ηD↓ ·
δ2
1− δ
.
(B16)
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